Rencana ini mirip satu rencana FEER yang telah diterjemahkan oleh sdr Kapal
itu ia tidak diterjemahkan kali ini.
Paving the way for Malaysia Airlines' sale
by eCountries' Malaysia correspondent (Thu, 21 Dec 2000)
The Malaysian government is trying to sell a big chunk of equity in loss-making
Airline System to an overseas carrier. But potential buyers are wary, fearing that Mahathir
Mohamad's interventionist administration is not prepared to surrender enough management
In Mahathir Mohamad's Malaysia, the term "privatization" is an oxymoron.
Buyers of state
assets usually have close links to the government, but little freedom to act independently of it.
Tajudin Ramli, a merchant banker turned entrepreneur, knows a thing or
two about tight
leashes. After taking up the offer of a supposedly controlling stake in Malaysian Airline
System (MAS) six years ago, he promised to make it the world's biggest carrier.
Some hope. His executive chairmanship has been characterized by big losses,
mounting customer dissatisfaction and plunging staff morale. Ramli signed a deal on
December 20 finalizing the sale of his 29% interest in MAS back to the government, which
has grudgingly accepted that only by bringing an overseas airline on board can MAS's
fortunes be reversed. Talks have been held with KLM, Qantas and Swissair, but there is no
sign of a taker as yet.
Who, after all, would want to be hobbled like Tajudin? The government has
the last word in all
MAS decision-making, meaning it can impose its will regardless of the commercial
implications. If the government wants the airline to fly to a loss-making overseas destination,
so be it. The many unprofitable Malaysian routes MAS must cover are also a big drain. They
cost the airline M$1m (US$263,000) each day, mainly because domestic fares have been
frozen since 1992 (and are therefore among the cheapest in the world). The phenomenon is
known locally as "national service," and MAS is not the only company enlisted.
Such social obligations are by no means the only reason MAS is heading
for a fourth straight
year of losses. Poor management and the recent economic crisis have also dragged it down.
In late 1995, as part of Tajudin's ambitious expansion plans, the company placed an order
with Boeing for ten 747-400s and 15 777-200s, to be delivered over five years. The price tag
was US$4bn, or M$10bn at the then exchange rate of M$2.5:US$1. But the eruption of the
Asian crisis in 1997 sent the ringgit into a tailspin, bloating the bill. The currency's slump also
inflated the cost of fuel, likewise denominated in US dollars. Lulled into a false sense of
security by the ringgit's previous solidity, MAS had hedged little of its huge foreign exchange
requirement. Revenue tumbled, too, owing to a crisis-induced slump in passenger and cargo
Tajudin needed a quick fix. Early in 1998 he decided to set up a wholly-owned
buy all of MAS's planes and lease them back to the carrier. The ringgit's depreciation meant
the subsidiary could make a substantial book-value gain from the arrangement, enabling the
chairman to reduce his own sizeable personal debts. But minority shareholders cried foul
when details of the plan were leaked, forcing it to be scrapped. So MAS cut costs where it
could, entering into numerous sale-and-leaseback deals with foreign companies, and
deferring the delivery of ordered aircraft. It also scrimped on pay-outs to staff, triggering a
flood of defections by pilots to more generous Asian rivals.
The government has finally read the writing on the wall. The decision to
ease out Tajudin and
seek an overseas partner cannot have been easy for ultra-nationalist Mahathir. Indeed as
recently as mid-year he killed two deals that would have seen Singaporean and Japanese
companies buying into another "strategic" industry - telecommunications - because they were
deemed to be demanding too much management control.
There are signs he may be willing to be more flexible about MAS. He has
hinted that the
government could relinquish the so-called "golden share" that allows it dictate the airline's
policy. Also encouraging is the recent exceptional increase in the permissible foreign
shareholding in MAS from 30% to 45%. Following the Brunei Investment Agency's sale of its
9.1% stake on December 1, foreigners - essentially institutional funds - now own just 7.5% of
the airline, meaning a strategic partner could take up almost 40%.
But potential buyers, while acknowledging that MAS has good growth prospects,
expressed little enthusiasm for it. Nor can they have been reassured by the fact that Tajudin
received M$8 a share for his stake - the price he paid in 1994 - more than double the current
market value of the stock. That premium will hardly make the hoped-for sale to a foreign
carrier any easier. Indeed the government's willingness to pay over the odds suggests a
determination to keep a tight rein on the airline.